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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - IMPLIED WARRANTY
PROVISIONS OF THE MARYLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARE APPLICABLE TO CONSUMER GOODS EVEN
WHEN THE TRANSACTION IS PREDOMINANTLY ONE FOR
THE RENDERING OF CONSUMER SERVICES. Anthony Pools v.
Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
A consumer' was injured when he slipped from a diving board
and fell onto the edge of his swimming pool. The diving board and
pool had been designed, manufactured, and installed by the contrac-
tor, Anthony Pools.2 The consumer and his wife sued the contractor
for damages based on theories of strict liability in tort3 and breach of
an implied warranty of merchantability.4 The contractor allegedly
breached the warranty because the skid resistant material on top of the
diving board stopped approximately one inch short of each edge.' The
Circuit Court for Montgomery County directed a verdict in favor of the
contractor based on warranty limitations contained in the contract of
sale.6 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed,
holding that the swimming pool package constituted consumer goods
under section 9-109 of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code
(Maryland U.C.C.).7 Therefore, since section 2-316.1 of the Maryland
U.C.C. prohibits the modification or exclusion of implied warranties in
the sale of consumer goods,8 the contractor's attempt to do so was inef-
fective. 9 In affirming this decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that when consumer goods, sold as part of a sales-service transac-
tion, retain their character as consumer goods after the transaction is
1. Plaintiff is characterized as a "consumer" since the allegedly defective diving
board, which is the basis of the plaintiffs cause of action, is a consumer good as
defined in U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (1978).
2. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 286-87, 455 A.2d 434, 435 (1983).
3. Id That portion of the court of special appeals' opinion that dealt with the strict
liability issue is beyond the scope of this casenote. The issue is noteworthy,
though, because that court held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
jury that a consumer's contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liability
cause of action. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 626, 440 A.2d 1085,
1092 (1982), a/§'d, 295 Md. 285, 299, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983) (adopting the court
of special appeals' discussion of the issue).
4. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 287, 455 A.2d 434, 435-36 (1983). An
implied warranty of merchantability attaches to goods sold by a merchant of
goods of that kind. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975).
5. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 287, 455 A.2d 434, 435-36 (1983).
6. Id at 287, 455 A.2d at 436. The contractor excluded all warranties, express and
implied, that were not contained in the written contract.
7. "Goods are (1) 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes.... ".MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-
109(l) (1975).
8. "Any oral or written language used by a seller of consumer goods and services,
which attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's reme-
dies for breach of those warranties, is unenforceable." Id § 2-316.1.
9. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 619-20, 440 A.2d 1085, 1088-89
(1982), a/f'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
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completed, the implied warranty provisions of the Maryland U.C.C.' °
apply, even when the transaction is predominantly one for the render-
ing of consumer services."
Contracts like the one in issue in Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 2 in-
volving both the sale of goods and the rendering of services, are com-
mon.13 Generally, courts faced with this type of contract initially
determine whether it is a contract for goods or services. If the court
determines that the contract is a transaction in goods, it is governed by
article two of the U.C.C. 4 If the court finds that the contract is for
services, however, article two is inapplicable. Because this determina-
tion will conclude such important matters as whether a warranty will
be implied,' 5 or which statute of limitations will govern,' 6 the outcome
of the litigation may depend on the characterization of the contract.
While there is little doubt that a court will apply article two to a pure
sale of goods situation and deny its application in a pure service con-
text, between these two extremes lies the hybrid transaction featuring
characteristics of both sale and service. Most courts apply the essence
or predominant purpose test in determining whether a contract is one
for the sale of goods or one for the rendition of services.' 7
In 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in Bonebrake v. Cox ' applied the predominant purpose test to a con-
tract for the sale and installation of bowling lanes and related equip-
ment. In holding that the contract was governed by article two of the
U.C.C., the court stated that the test for determining whether a transac-
tion is one for goods or services is whether the transaction's predomi-
10. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975).
11. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 298, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (1983).
12. 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
13. Note, Contractsfor Goods and Services and Article 2 of the Un!/orm Commercial
Code, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 303 (1978).
14. Article two "applies to transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1983). "Goods"
are defined as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale." Id § 2-105(1).
15. Article two of the U.C.C. provides for three types of implied warranties:
merchantability, id § 2-314; fitness for a particular purpose, id. § 2-315; and, good
title, id § 2-312.
16. An action based on the U.C.C. must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued. Id. § 2-725(1).
17. LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981); Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572 (7th Cir.
1976); Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977);
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. International Harvester Co., 429 F. Supp. 341
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221
(1975); Rifle v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Burton v. Artery Co.,
279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977); Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 147 N.J.
Super. 77, 370 A.2d 547 (1977); Milau Assocs., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42
N.Y.2d 482, 368 N.E.2d 1247 (1977); Allied Indus. Serv. Corp. v. Kasle Iron &
Metals, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 2d 144, 405 N.E.2d 307 (1977); Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 652, 664 (1957).
18. 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
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nant purpose is for the rendition of services or for the sale of goods.' 9
Unlike the above jurisdictions,20 at least one state has taken a sig-
nificantly different approach in determining whether to apply the
U.C.C. implied warranty provisions in a sales-service transaction. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,21 decided
that this determination should be based on policy considerations un-
derlying the theory of implied warranty such as consumer reliance
22
and the marketing responsibility of the seller.23 In Newmark, a beauty
salon patron brought suit based on breach of an implied warranty
when her hair and scalp were injured, allegedly by a defective perma-
nent wave lotion administered by the operator of the salon.24 The New-
mark court found that whether an implied warranty arises should not
depend on the artificial distinction between a sale and a service. 25 In-
stead, the court stated this determination should be based on the policy
reasons for imposing warranty liability in the case of an ordinary sale.26
For example, a beauty salon operator holds himself out as possessing
the knowledge to give a permanent wave and, consequently, the patron
relies upon the operator's expertise in the selection as well as the appli-
cation of the products used in the treatment.27 Moreover, the Newmark
court noted that the salon operator, having the status of a retailer, was
part of the entire marketing venture that should bear the cost of injuries
resulting from the sale of defective products.
28
In Maryland, Burton v. Artery Co. ,29 was the first case in which the
court of appeals had to determine whether a hybrid contract was one
for the sale of goods or the rendering of services. In this 1977 decision
19. Id at 960. After stating this test, the court summarily concluded that the contract
at issue was clearly one for goods as defined by the U.C.C. Id
20. See supra note 17.
21. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
22. Id at 593-94, 258 A.2d at 701-02. For a more detailed discussion of consumer
reliance as a basis for implied warranties, see Signal, Extending Implied Warran-
ties Beyond Goods: Equal Protectionfor Consumers of Services, 12 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 859, 878-85 (1977).
23. Newmark, 54 N.J. at 600-01, 258 A.2d at 704-05; see also Comment, Sales-Service
Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575, 580-81 (1974) (discuss-
ing marketing responsibility as a reason for implying warranties). Other policy
reasons for implying warranties include the seller's being in a better position to
bear any loss caused by defective products, his ability to redistribute the loss to his
customers, and the seller's superior knowledge that gives him the opportunity to
discover any defects in the products. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service
Transactions: Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV.
661, 688-93.
24. Newmark, 54 N.J. at 598, 258 A.2d at 698-99.
25. Id at 592, 258 A.2d at 700.
26. Id at 593-94, 258 A.2d at 701-02.
27. Id at 594, 258 A.2d at 701.
28. Id at 600, 258 A.2d at 704-05.
29. 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977); see also Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 9
U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 637 (1971-1972) (under predominant purpose
test, furnishing of blood for transfusions is a service, not a sale).
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the court considered whether the four year statute of limitations under
the Maryland U.C.C.30 or the three year general limitations statute
31
applied to a contract for the furnishing and planting of a large amount
of sod as well as several hundred trees and shrubs.32 The court, adopt-
ing the predominant purpose test enunciated in Bonebrake, held that
the substantial number of trees and shrubs indicated that the "predomi-
nant factor here, the thrust, the purpose, reasonably stated, is a transac-
tion of sale with labor incidentally involved. 33 Hence, the four year
statute under the Maryland U.C.C. was applicable. 34
Six years later, however, in Anthony Pools v. Sheehan,3 the court
declined to apply the predominant purpose test in deciding whether
implied warranties under the Maryland U.C.C. apply to consumer
goods that are part of a sales-service transaction.36 In attempting to
determine whether the pool construction contract should be governed
by article two of the Maryland U.C.C., the Anthony Pools court sur-
veyed similar cases from other jurisdictions that used a predominant
purpose test.37 Despite this persuasive authority, the court rejected the
predominant purpose test based on its interpretation of section 2-316.1
of the Maryland U.C.C.38 Since this section provides that a seller can-
not modify or exclude implied warranties as to "consumer goods...
services or both,"' 39 the court reasoned that the General Assembly in-
tended consumer goods to be subject to the implied warranty provi-
sions of the Maryland U.C.C. even though they are part of a contract
for services.' Had the predominant purpose test been applied to the
swimming pool transaction, the diving board would not have been cov-
ered by an implied warranty of merchantability since the contract was
essentially one for services.41 This result, the court concluded, "would
30. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-725(1) (1975).
31. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1980).
32. Burton v. Artery Co., 279 Md. 94, 95-96, 367 A.2d 935, 935-36 (1977).
33. Id at 114-15, 367 A.2d at 946; accord Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs.,
38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977) (contract to furnish and install carpet for
228 apartments was predominantly a sale of goods).
34. Burton, 279 Md. at 115, 367 A.2d at 946.
35. 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983).
36. Id at 297-98, 455 A.2d at 441.
37. Id. at 292, 455 A.2d at 438. The results reached in the cases surveyed by the court
were not uniform. Id; see Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364
A.2d 1221 (1975) (pool owners did not offer sufficient evidence on proper appor-
tionment between labor and materials, and thus failed to establish the existence of
an implied warranty under the U.C.C.); Rifle v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977) (installation of swimming pool is a transaction in goods); Ben Constr.
Co. v. Ventre, 23 A.D.2d 44, 257 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1965) (pre-U.C.C. case involving
swimming pool construction contract primarily for labor and services and not a
transaction in goods under New York personal property law).
38. Anthony Pools, 295 Md. at 297-98, 455 A.2d at 440-41.
39. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975).
40. Anthony Pools, 295 Md. at 297-98, 455 A.2d at 440-41.
41. Id
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be contrary to the legislative policy implicit in section 2-316.1.142
To effectuate legislative intent, the court in Anthony Pools adopted
a "gravamen test."' 43 Under this test, an implied warranty is imposed
on the goods portion of a sales-service contract if the cause of action is
based on an alleged defect in the goods. With respect to the swimming
pool transaction, an implied warranty would therefore attach to the
diving board because the cause of action was based on the allegation
that the board was not merchantable.' The Anthony Pools court thus
held that the implied warranty provisions of the Maryland U.C.C.
would apply to consumer goods that retain their character as consumer
goods after the performance promised to the consumer is completed,
even if the transaction is predominantly one for the rendering of
services.45
The court's decision that the diving board in Anthony Pools was
subject to the implied warranty provisions of the Maryland U.C.C. is
sound because policy considerations underlying the theory of implied
warranty such as consumer reliance46 and marketing responsibility of
the seller47 were clearly applicable in this case. The pool contractor
was an expert in designing, manufacturing, and installing swimming
pools and related equipment. As in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,48 the
consumer in Anthony Pools relied on the contractor's expertise to sup-
ply a safe pool and equipment.4 9 Moreover, like the salon operator in
Gimbel's, the contractor occupied the status of a retailer, and thus
should be liable for injuries caused by the defective products it sold. °
While the court in Anthony Pools may have considered these factors in
reaching its decision,5" it did not explicitly base its holding on a policy
approach. It would seem, however, that while the court's gravamen test
is preferable to the predominant purpose test in effectuating legislative
intent, a policy approach enhances flexibility by allowing courts to con-
sider various reasons for extending U.C.C. warranties to sales-service
42. Id at 297-98, 455 A.2d at 441.
43. Id. at 298, 455 A.2d at 441. This test was proposed by Dean Hawkland in 1 W.
HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE SERIES § 2-102:04 (1982). Maryland
is the first jurisdiction to adopt this test.
44. Anthony Pools, 295 Md. at 298, 455 A.2d at 441.
45. Id
46. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
49. See supra note 23.
50. See supra note 24.
51. The court of appeals stated:
A number of commentators have advocated a more policy-oriented ap-
proach to determining whether warranties of quality and fitness are im-
plied with respect to goods sold as part of a hybrid transaction in which
service predominates. [Citations omitted]. To support their position,
these commentators in general emphasize loss shifting, risk distribution,
consumer reliance, and difficulties in the proof of negligence.
Anthony Pools, 295 Md. at 294, 455 A.2d at 439.
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contracts. A policy approach has the further advantage of being con-
sistent with the U.C.C. requirement that its provisions be liberally con-
strued.52 Moreover, a policy approach, by abandoning the artificial
sales-service distinction, serves one of the U.C.C.'s purposes, which is
to modernize the law governing commercial transactions. 3
The Anthony Pools court also left unresolved several issues con-
cerning sales-service contracts. For example, it is unclear whether the
broad language of section 2-316.1 of the Maryland U.C.C., which en-
compasses consumer services, would support a finding that an implied
warranty attaches to pure service transactions.54 The court also left un-
answered whether consumer goods that do not retain their character as
consumer goods after the sales-service transaction is completed, such as
permanent wave lotions, will be subject to implied warranties under the
Maryland U.C.C. 5 Since the court of appeals discussed the result in
Gimbel's approvingly,56 perhaps it will extend its holding to this type of
"goods" as well. Finally, the court did not address the question of
which test governs when sections of the Maryland U.C.C. other than
section 2-316.1 are at issue. Thus, Burton v. Artery Co.," in which the
court used the predominant purpose test to determine whether the
Maryland U.C.C.'s statute of limitations applied to a sales-service con-
tract,58 is apparently still viable precedent in Maryland.
The decision by the court of appeals in Anthony Pools to extend
the implied warranty provisions of the Maryland U.C.C. to consumer
goods, even though the goods are part of a transaction that is predomi-
nantly one for services, is supported by a statutory interpretation of
section 2-316.1 and by the policy considerations underlying the theory
of implied warranty. Unlike a true policy approach, however, the gra-
vamen test adopted by the court is inflexible since it does not permit a
court to consider the policy reasons for extending U.C.C. warranties
that will differ from case to case.
Dennis J Bodley
52. Note, supra note 13, at 315; see U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1983).
53. Note, supra note 13, at 316; see U.C.C. § 1-102 (2)(a) (1983).
54. The court expressly left this question open. Anthony Pools, 295 Md. at 298 n.5,
455 A.2d at 441 n.5. Very few courts have found an implied warranty of
merchantability in pure service transactions. Greenfield, supra note 23, at 671;
see, e.g., J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 588 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Hepp
Bros. v. Evans, 420 P.2d 477 (Okla. 1966); Cox v. Cumutt, 271 P.2d 342 (Okla.
1954).
55. Anthony Pools, 295 Md. at 298, 455 A.2d at 441.
56. Id. at 294-95, 455 A.2d at 439-40.
57. 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977).
58. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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